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AT THE ELBOW AND UNDER PRESSURE:
LEGAL, MILITARY, AND INTELLIGENCE
PROFESSIONALS
Dakota S. Rudesill*

I.

INTRODUCTION

From morning staff meetings at federal agencies, to National
Security Council meetings at the White House, to late-night
videoconferences with American personnel in the field on the other side
of the globe, deliberations across the United States government's
national security apparatus involve multiple professional communities.
Individuals in legal, military, and intelligence positions each have the
opportunity to provide insight particular to their respective disciplines,
while also shouldering special obligations as members of professional
tribes. Normally, interactions among these tribes and relationships with
decision-makers are collaborative and constructive. But too often, work
across professional lines and relationships with powerful principals are
beset by tension and dysfunction. Distrust among the professions and
pressure by decision-makers to shade their work can become serious
problems for professionals in each tribe, reducing the effectiveness of
the government as a whole and driving up risk to national security.
Meanwhile, professionals in each field can lose their credentials due to
loss of professional independence, compromise of confidential
information, or other ethical lapses. In short, lawyers, military personnel,

* Associate Professor, Moritz College of Law, and Co-Leader of Security and Governance
Research, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University. This
Article is based on the author's remarks upon receiving the Sidney D. Drell Academic Achievement
Award from the Intelligence and National Security Alliance. I thank the Staff and Editors of the
Hofstra Law Review for their patience and good work, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic
and its many disruptions. For reading drafts and helpful comments, I thank Alex Joel, Daniel
Maurer, Mark Nevitt, and Corin Stone. For research assistance, I thank Brian Babb, Elly Bennett,
Helen Fite, Shelby Leighton, and Bailey Sanders. I am responsible for all content and any errors.
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and intelligence officers are similarly situated in important respects.1
They can also find common ethical cause in the face of decision-maker
pressure that became severe in the Trump era.
Too little attention has been accorded to these professions in
foundational
This Article identifies
comparative
perspective.
commonalities and notable distinctions among the roles of these
professions in the context of government, and particularly, the American
national security apparatus. This Article's aims are both academic and
practical: spurring further comparative analysis, while also enriching
awareness of the intense pressure these professionals presently face-to
their professional peril and to the peril of good governance in our
republic.
This Article first considers the who of these three professions. It
argues that lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers all belong to
distinct but fundamentally similar ethical professions. 2 These guilds
have in common key attributes and core ethical commitments. All three
professions are characterized by special expertise, training, licensing,
and ethical obligations, the foremost of which is professional
independence.
Part III concerns the why, explaining that all three professions are
enormously important to the republic for similar reasons. 3 Most notably,
their expertise and special skills manage the complexity of challenges
facing the country, and their independence works as a check on error and

bad faith by public officials.
Part TV focuses on the what and the how of legal, military, and
intelligence work.4 Members of the professions collaborate within their
guilds; collaborate with other guilds; often work adversarily and at
considerable peril; and manage themselves individually, particularly
their human susceptibility for corruption (by others and the self). They
often serve demanding principals who may not share their professional
outlook or heightened ethical standards-and sometimes seek to

1. Other professions represented in government have similarities in their professional
attributes, as well, and also have come in for tremendous pressure in recent years. They include

journalists, budgeteers, climate scientists and weather forecasters, physicians, and other experts on
public health and disease. This Article focuses on lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers
because of their special centrality to national security.
2. See infra Part II. The three professions overlap. The military and intelligence professions
include lawyers. And the vast majority of U.S. intelligence professionals serve in the military or
work at agencies, such as the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, that are
part of the Department of Defense. Military intelligence lawyers stand at the intersection of all three
communities.
3. See infra Part III.

4.

See infra Part V.
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intimidate or manipulate them. Wedged between their principles and
principals, the core, challenging, and continual task of lawyers,
servicemembers, and intelligence officers is to balance their obligations
of professional independence and service to a principal. There are
special challenges to the independence-versus-service balancing when
they are asked to become agents or advocates for their principals.
In Part V, this Article turns to the singularly stressful now for these
professional guardians of law, force, and fact.5 Legal, military, and
intelligence personnel in the public arena and in government in recent
years have faced severe and perilous pressures. This Article identifies a
slate of independence-buttressing steps these professions and their allies
should take. 6 These begin with looking beyond professional
parochialism to recognize their common challenges, especially when
working behind the veil of secrecy and classification. Similarly situated
in their opportunities, obligations, and importance to good governance in
our republic, these professionals need to come to their common
defense-and be better protected in their independence by the law, by
their institutions, and by the public they ultimately serve.
II.

THE WHO: ETHICAL PROFESSIONS WITH COMMON COMMITMENTS

Everyone who has served in or studied government has seen the
dark side of esprit de corps: a combination of arrogance about the
importance of one's own institution or agency and distrust of others.7
There is professional parochialism, too, and it often manifests as
condescension and paranoia. "They"-the lawyers, "the uniforms," "the
spooks," depending on who is talking-cannot be allowed (variously) to
control operations, to control the paper flow, to chair the meetings, to
slow decision-making, or even to know what one's organization or team
knows. That is because "they" do not understand the issues, cannot
sufficiently protect sensitive information, do not appreciate the peril to
personnel or other vital equities, or cannot move quickly. That there is
sometimes a kernel of truth to these concerns keeps them well-fed and
resilient. Yet too often this parochialism exacerbates classic national
security process maladies: secrecy to the exclusion of key stakeholders
with vital insight or information, excessive speed that results in

5.
6.
7.

See infra PartV.
See infra Part V.B.
See
Overview:

Esprit

de

corps,

OXFORD

REFERENCE,

https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.201 10803095758104 (last visited Nov.
7, 2020) (defining esprit de corps as "a feeling of pride, fellowship, and common loyalty shared by
the members of a particular group").
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under-informed decisions, personalization and ego, and claims of
consequence ("people could die") that cover instead for bureaucratic
self-interest or ignorance of the value-added of other actors.8 The
ultimate adversary may be a foreign power or terrorist organization, but
the near enemy too often is other American public servants with
different backgrounds and roles.
In reality, lawyers, military servicemembers, and intelligence
officers have much in common. They are members of similar ethical
professions, ones with similar attributes and a common core of ethical
commitments.
The first common professional attribute is special expertise. Legal
doctrine, war, and espionage are not matters of daily experience for most
of society. That they sound complex, mysterious, and perilous translates
to prestige for those with deep knowledge and experience in these fields.
From the outside, professionals within these guilds may appear to have
sorcerer-like capabilities: to use legal argument and filings to change the
fate of lives and livelihoods, to employ lethal force in defense of the
community, and to collect and assess classified information and conduct
sabotage and counter-spy operations.9 As guild members, lawyers,
soldiers, and intelligence personnel are elite and speak with special
authority.
The special expertise of the three professions flows from their elite
training. Even in an advanced, highly-educated society, relatively small
fractions of the population have attended law school or clerked for a
judge, graduated from a military academy or have been taught the use of
combat arms, much less been schooled in espionage at the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") "farm" or attended the Sherman Kent
School for Intelligence Analysis at "the Agency." 10
Special knowledge and training are prerequisites for special
licensing. For the lawyer, the law license is awarded for successful
completion of a law degree, bar examination, and (in most states)
professional responsibility examination passage and passage of a

8. See JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 123-24 (2007).

9. The knowledge and skills of intelligence officers are often so specialized that former
intelligence agency personnel sometimes have a difficult time securing rewarding, post-government
employment. They cannot discuss much or any of what they know or what they did.
10. Ted Gup, Down on 'The Farm': Learning How to Spy for the CIA, WASH. POST (Feb. 19,
1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/02/19/down-on-the-farm-learning-howto-spy-for-the-cia/fbe2f23c-ab8d-4fba-aab2-lclda55flc53; Offices of CIA: Training Resources,
(last visited
CIA, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/training-resources.html
Nov. 7, 2020).
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character and fitness investigation." A servicemember's or intelligence
officer's commission is somewhat similar, but the best analogy to the
law license for these professionals is the security clearance. The
Standard Form for National Security Positions, the SF-86, gathers
largely the same information from applicants as do bar character and
fitness forms.1 2 Both filings-and the interviews and investigations that
follow-can be highly intrusive and often uncomfortable. These reviews
focus on employment record, history of compliance with the law, and
personal failings and circumstances (especially reputation for honesty,
substance abuse, and unmanageable debts) that bear on one's character
and therefore suitability to be entrusted with extremely sensitive
information and weighty responsibilities.13 The courts have made clear
that receiving bar admission and security clearances are privileges and
not rights. 4
Expertise, training, and licensing requirements screen and prepare
candidates for the special and fundamentally similar ethical
commitments of the legal, military, and intelligence professions. Each
profession is bound by an ethical code, articulated in documents that
carry that term and also in training materials, adjudicative opinions
related to alleged violations, and the writings of leaders, practitioners,
and scholars. Lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers are defined by
the role assumption and ego subordination inherent in these ethics
regimes. Individuals in these professions all have special occupational
identities and have fiduciary duties of loyalty, acting in the interest of
others-most often principals, superiors, clients, and colleagues. 5 For

11. California allows one to become a lawyer through self-study or bar passage. Almost all
states require bar passage. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements: 2020, NAT'L
CONF. BAR EXAM'RS, https://www.ncbex.org/assets/BarAdmissionGuide/CompGuide2020_021820

_OnlineFinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
12. See Questionnairefor National Security Positions: SF86, U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT. (Nov.
2016), https://www.gsa.gov/Forms/TrackForm/33130.
13. See id.; David Jaffe & Janet Stearns, Conduct Yourselves Accordingly: Amending Bar
Characterand Fitness Questions to Promote Lawyer Well-Being, AM. BAR ASS'N (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/professional lawyer/2
6/2/conduct-yourselves-accordingly-amending-bar-character-and-fitness-questions-promote-lawyerwellbeing.
14. See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) ("[N]o one has a 'right' to a
security clearance."). Denials in both instances are frequently appealed administratively, sometimes
to federal courts, and only sometimes successfully. Compare Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 656,
660-61, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying appellant's privileges and immunities and equal protection
clause claims against Illinois state bar officials), with Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1400-01,
1403-04 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying appellant's request for an injunction against revocation of her
security clearance).
15. A further analogue is the fiduciary duties of the soldier, juror, and voter to act in the
general public interest. See Edward B. Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153,
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the government lawyer, the duties attach regarding their immediate
organizational client and the ultimate clients: the interests of justice, the
public, and the Constitution. 16 Similarly, soldiers and intelligence
officers swear oaths to the Constitution and to the protection of the
nation.17
Integral to role assumption and fiduciary duty are the heightened
ethical commitments to professional independence, integrity, and
protection of confidences (attorney-client confidences for the lawyer and
classified information). They are heightened duties in the sense that they
ask more than general societal norms and often more than the law. For
lawyers, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") prohibit
the lawyer from allowing a client to direct or interfere with the lawyer's
"independence of professional judgment"; require candor to clients,
tribunals, and third parties; bar "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation"; and extensively regulate the protection of
client confidences. 18 Similar state bar rules impose these obligations at
pain of loss of license or other discipline.' 9 While the military is subject
to the authority, direction, and control of civilians who hold office as the
result of partisan elections and appointments, the ethos of the profession
of arms in the United States is staunchly apolitical.20 That is, the armed
forces stay out of partisan and electoral politics. The military is part of
the executive branch of the federal government but the military
services-the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and Space
Force-remain organizationally distinct and professionally independent.
157-58, 190-91 (2015).
16. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 124-25 (illustrating that the clients for the national security
lawyer include the lawyer's agency and the Constitution).

17. See 10 U.S.C. § 502(a); 5 U.S.C. § 3331. Ego subordination, and loyalty to the nation and
fellow personnel, inhere throughout the order President Dwight Eisenhower issued, since amended,
to govern U.S. servicemembers who become prisoners. See Exec. Order No. 10631, 3 C.F.R. § 266
(1954-1958).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 11; r. 1.8(f)(2) (Current Clients: Specific
Rules), 5.4(c) (Professional Independence of a Lawyer), 2.1 (Advisor), 3.3(a) (Candor Toward the
Tribunal), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 8.4(c) (Misconduct), 1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
19.

See,

e.g.,

Rule

X.

Rules

of

Professional

Conduct,

D.C.

BAR,

https://www.dcbar.org/about/who-we-are/rules-and-bylaws/rules-governing-the-district-of-columbia
-bar (last visited Nov. 7, 2020); Rule X. Disciplinary Proceedings, D.C. BAR,
https://www.debar.org/about/who-we-are/rules-and-bylaws/rules-governing-the-district-of-columbia
-bar/rule-xi-disciplinary-proceedings (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
20. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES app. 2.1 § 2.7 (2019)
[hereinafter MCM] ("[i]nappropriate [c]onsiderations" in court-martial proceedings include "the
accused's . . . lawful political association, activities, or beliefs," and "[p]olitical pressure to take or
not to take specific actions in the case"); MCM, supra, MIL. R. EVID. 508 ("A person has a privilege
to refuse to disclose the tenor of the person's vote at a political election conducted by secret ballot
unless the vote was cast illegally.").
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This independence is reflected in norms and regulations keeping the
military out of politics, and traditions and statutory protections for the
independent views of senior military officers and lawyers. 21 The ethical
codes of the military services centrally emphasize professional identity
and ego subordination, service to the nation and the Constitution, and
integrity and truth-telling.22 So, too, does the Intelligence Community's
("IC") principles of professional ethics.2 3 The intelligence principles and
the statute creating the position of Director of National Intelligence
stipulate that intelligence shall be objective and free of political
considerations. 24 And, all three varieties of professionals face loss of
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1344.10 §§ 2, 4 (Feb. 19, 2008);
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, § 201,
100 Stat. 1005 (1986), codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 151 (highlighting that with notice to the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff may provide their own views to Congress on any
matter concerning the Department of Defense), § 153(b)(2) (showing that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall provide risk assessment to Congress regarding national military strategy,

transmitted through the Secretary of Defense, who may add comments), § 153(c) (showing that the
Chairman shall submit directly to Congress a report on the needs of the combatant commands,
including the Chairman's views on whether the President's budget request is deficient); DANIEL
MAURER, CRISIS, AGENCY, AND LAW IN U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 43-45 (2017)

(explaining the independence of the Chairman under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986); James
Stavridis, I Spent My Career in the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Military Must Stand Up for Its Soul in This

Moment, TIME (June 3, 2020, 1:28 PM), https://time.com/5847343/military-stand-up-for-its-soul
(writing that the military "must remain above the fray of domestic politics"). Regarding military

lawyers, see, for example, 10 U.S.C. § 8088(e) (banning interference with the ability of Navy
lawyers to "give independent legal advice"). The apolitical professional military idea in America
owes much to the classic theoretical work of political scientist Samuel Huntington. See generally
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957). Critiques include claims that his formulations are too

simplistic and that the idea that the military should operate in a realm different from civilian
policy-making is unrealistic and may even have perverse consequences.

See, e.g., Risa Brooks,

Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States, INT'L
SECURITY, Spring 2020, at 7. See generally MAURER, supra (explaining that the relationship among

civilian leaders and the military is understood as one involving principals and agents).
22.

See,

e.g.,

The

Air

Force

Core

Values,

CURTIS

E.

LEMAY

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Volume_2/V2-D05-Core-Values.pdf

CTR.,

(Aug.

8,

2015) (explaining that Air Force values are "integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all
we do"); Honor Concept, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/About/honorconcept.php (last

visited Nov. 7, 2020) (highlighting that "[m]idshipmen are persons of integrity" and do not lie,
cheat, or steal). These pieces of guidance emerge from the administrative side of the military, while
other ethics guidance can be provided by operational commands. For the distinction, see generally
Mark P. Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. REV. 905 (2019).

23. See Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community, OFF. DIR. NAT'L
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020); see also
INTEL., https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we-work/ethics
OFF. DIR. NAT'L INTEL., INTEL. CMTY. STANDARD No. 610-3, at 3-4 (Oct. 4, 2010).

24. See Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community, supra note 23;
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 102A, 118 Stat. 3644
(2004), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3024(a)(2) (explaining that the Director of National
Intelligence as head of the intelligence community ("IC") shall ensure that intelligence provided to
executive and legislative branches is "objective [and] independent of political considerations").
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security clearance for mishandling national security's confidencesclassified information.2 s
III.

THE

WHY-THE

PROFESSIONS MATTER FOR SIMILAR REASONS

Similarity in the professional attributes and core ethical
commitments of the legal, military, and intelligence guilds reflects their
common functions. The who of the professions which have just been
considered flows from their raison d'etre, their why. 26
Professions represent a distributed institutional approach to
managing the complexity, scale, and other daunting demands of specific
social problems. Advising and arguing about the law in a modern state,
protecting against the high-intensity organized violence threatened by a
Russian armored division or 9/11-scale terrorist attack, and stealing
secrets from foreign states and countering foreign espionage-much less
doing all of these things well-are tasks too large and elaborate for
non-specialists. The expertise, training, licensure requirements, and high
ethical standards-plus the size of the professions-make profoundly
difficult and ramified societal tasks manageable. The professions
improve the quality of decision-making by sorting, delegating, and
analyzing the issues in a sophisticated way. They enable
decision-makers without subject matter expertise to make and implement
high quality decisions.
In a republic with frequent elections and the popular sovereignty
they reflect, the professions enable and channel governance by elected
officials attentive to public and partisan opinion. The professions serve
the State and its people regardless of which officials or parties hold
office, enabling the preferences of voters and politicos to be pursued and
implemented in a competent way. Traditionally, the professions also
subtly but importantly manage politics by providing agreed, common
frames of reference for expert, decision-maker, and public conversation
regarding law and fact.
In this way, the professions also serve as a check on error and bad
faith by political actors. Deep knowledge, training, licensure, and ethical
commitments to integrity and professional independence give legal,
military, and intelligence personnel credibility to contest uninformed
25. Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (prescribing a "uniform system
for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information"); Exec. Order No.
13467, 73 Fed. Reg. 38103 (June 30, 2008) (promoting alignment of policies and processes related
to access to classified information).
https://www.merriamWEBSTER,
MERRIAM
D'&tre,
Raison
26. See
webster.com/dictionary/raison%20d%27%C3%AAtre (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (defining the
phrase as "reason or justification for existence").
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opinions. Professionalism provides firm footing to refuse to participate
in fraud, lies, self-dealing, and other malfeasance and abuse of authority
by politicos. In this way, these professionals embody "good
government" and public integrity values that are in the public interest
regardless of the vagaries of elected official, partisan, or public
sentiment about personalities, parties, or policy.
This work of the professions of law, arms, and intelligence is
especially vital in the national security space. Here, the safety and liberty
of the country intersect. Much national security process also happens in
classified settings. It is insulated by secrecy and dispatch from public
knowledge, judicial review, and often from oversight by Congress. In
classification's darkest corners, the common attributes and commitments
of the professions facilitate quality decisions, stand against malfeasance,
and buttress the rule of law.2 7
IV.

THE WHAT AND THE How-WHAT THE PROFESSIONS Do AND
How THEY FAIL

Stories involving conflict are archetypically about humans versus
humans, humans versus the elements, and humans versus themselves.
Legal, military, and intelligence work involve similar relational
struggles. The extent to which, in the course of these interactions,
professionals uphold their ethical commitments reflects how well they
and their guilds are serving their purposes in the interest of their
principals and the public.
A.

Working Relationally

To begin, legal, military, and intelligence practitioners all
collaborate within their profession. The MRPC anticipate that lawyers
practice cooperatively.28 They are expected to consult one another and
are assumed to share client confidences. 29 The military distinguishes
itself from vigilantes and armed gangs by serving the State as a trained
corporal unit, fixated from the first day of bootcamp to the last moments
of a war on synergistically operating as a combined-arms team with
unity of command and collaborative effort. Intelligence work is the work
of teams, involving collectors, analysts, information brokers, gadget
builders (physical and digital), case officers and other operators in the
27. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 53.
28. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(c) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2020).

29. See id. at r. 1.6 & cmts. 1, 2, 5, 9, 13-14 (explaining the exceptions to revealing client
confidences between lawyers); see also id. at r. 1.0(c) cmt. 2, r. 1.0(k) & cmts. 8-10 (defining "law
firm" and "screening").
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'

security officers, lawyers, and briefers.
field, administrators,
Breakdowns in a profession's ethical culture can be especially damaging
when they involve recruits undergoing indoctrination-navigating their
initial training and apprenticeship years, when collaboration within one's
professional silo is most intense; when values, skills, and culture are
inculcated; and when esprit de corps is forged. All three of these
professions therefore emphasize, and continually review and improve,
initial training, entry on duty, and apprenticeship.30
Legal, military, and intelligence practice progressively involves
greater collaboration among professions as careers unfold and
professionals move up. Complex national security issues often have
multiple and interrelated legal, military, and intelligence aspects.
Therefore, cross-disciplinary interactions are imperative for quality
decisions. But these interdisciplinary interactions can be fraught due to
parochial arrogance and distrust, cultural differences, terminology
variations, and the persistence of monodisciplinary training for new
entrants within legal, military, and intelligence organizations and in
higher education. 3
Collaboration is one part of the preparation for another common
feature of legal, military, and intelligence practice: working
30. Initial training and apprenticeship are matters of continual focus for the three professions.
See, for example, the legal community's conversations about law schools and clerkships, the
military's extensive investment of time and effort in basic and other initial training for younger
personnel, and the IC's traditions and emphasis on values at the start of an intelligence officer's
career. See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in HistoricalPerspective, 69

WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1949 (2012) (discussing critiques of the ability of legal education to
adequately train law students for law practice); see also Military Life, MYFUTURE,
https://www.myfuture.com/military/military-life (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (discussing experiences
that servicemembers have in common); Michael J. Morell, Declassified: Martin Petersen on the
Tiananmen Crisis and Training CIA Analysts, INTEL. MATTERS (July
15, 2020),

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/declassified-martin-petersen-on-tiananmen-crisis-training/idl
286906615?i=1000484983789 (featuring former CIA Training Director Martin Petersen relating the
remarks he gave to all new CIA employees about the ethos and responsibilities of intelligence
work).
31. Of course, these are significant problems within the legal, military, and intelligence
communities as well. Prosecutors and defense lawyers are often adversarial to an unprofessional
degree, the United States military has undertaken a generational effort to enhance interoperability
and drive down inter-service rivalry, and with a nearly two-decade lag behind the military, the IC,

since the mid-2000s, has been working to break down barriers and distrust among its seventeen
components. See Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1426-28,

1454-58 (2018); Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-433, § 201, 100 Stat. 1005 (1986), codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 151(f), 153(b)(2),
153(c) (restructuring the Department of Defense to promote multi-service jointness); WILLIAM A.
OWENS & EDWARD OFFLEY, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR 202-04 (2000) (advocating for the United

States military force to deploy "as a single entity," organized for "the most efficient and effective
use of resources"); 50 U.S.C. § 3024 (key provision of statute restructuring the intelligence
establishment to promote interoperability, information sharing, and unity of effort).
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adversarially, often at professional and personal peril. Unlike its civil
law counterparts around the world, the American legal system is
generally adversarial where courts are involved and often in other
settings as well.3 2 The profession of arms structures itself to prevail in
humanity's most dangerous contest, war. Servicemembers work in
concert with intelligence officers who often share their exposure to
armed attack in the field. 33 At foreign postings far from hot warzones,
and even stateside at work and at home, intelligence professionals face
surveillance, potential recruitment efforts, and sometimes harassment by
foreign intelligence services.34 They have faced violent attack by
terrorists.35 Professionals in all three fields share with their families the
burdens of lives lived adversarially.
Intra- and inter-professional work, and especially practice in
adversarial settings, provide opportunities for lawyers, servicemembers,
and spies to fail at their most intimate relationship, their relationship
with themselves. Amid the friction, fear, fog, and uncertainty that
characterize war and other perilous national security activities, 36
servicemembers or intelligence professionals in the field can be tempted
to violate the rules-for example, the international law of armed conflict
or domestic laws on detainee treatment. Captives face physical duress to
give up secrets or otherwise betray their values and their country. But
compromise less commonly stems from combat, torture, and other

32.

However, legal practice is becoming more collaborative and incorporating alternative

dispute resolution methods. See Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio & Peter Kamminga, The Changes in Legal
Infrastructure: Empirical Analysis of the Status and Dynamics Influencing the Development of

CollaborativeLaw Around the World, 38 J. LEGAL PRO. 191, 205-08, 213 (2014) (analyzing the
perception of collaborative law in the legal field).
33. Collaboration is increasingly common between the United States military and United
States IC, both stateside and in the field. They are more functionally inter-operable, and their legal
authorities have converged, as well. See generally Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title SO Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 539 (2012)
(discussing legal aspects of the convergence of military and intelligence activities).
34. Some reports indicate that advances in technology are making traditional, physical
monitoring less necessary for foreign intelligence services because digital methods are more
effective at tracking United States intelligence officers. See Emily Crane, Will the DigitalAge Kill
Off Spying? CIA in Crisis as FacialRecognition, Biometrics and AI Make It Increasingly Difficult
for Agents to Maintain Their Cover Abroad, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 30, 2019, 3:09 PM),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7837767/CIA-faces-crisis-intelligence-gathering-digitalfootprints.html.
35. See, e.g., Michael Morell, Declassified: FormerFBI Agent Bradley Garretton the Global
Manhunt
for
Mir
Aimal
Kansi,
INTEL.
MATTERS
(Aug.
5,
2020),

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/declassified-former-fbi-agent-bradley-garrett-on-globaid128
6906615?i=1000487146289 (portraying an account of the hunt for a terrorist who murdered two
CIA officers outside CIA headquarters in 1993).
36. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119-22, 138, 140 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret
trans. & eds., 1976) (contending that war is characterized by these conditions).
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physical coercion than it does from self-corruption: participation by
individuals in their own compromise. Thankfully, relatively few people
are deliberately unethical. More often, professionals rationalize
deviation from their obligations as de minimus, necessary to expedite
matters (a white lie or rule violation they think nobody will notice, for
example), or in some way deserved compensation for some other harm,
unfairness, or inconvenience. Analyses of whether a security clearance
candidate or holder can be trusted focus on susceptibilities organized
under the heading of "SMICE"-sex, money, ideology, contraband
37
(including substance abuse), and ego (or excitement). In addition to
problematic foreign contacts or history of serious mental illness,
investigators examine whether someone has shown poor judgment;
recklessness or tendency to rationalize doing the wrong thing; and errors
in their lives, presently or in the past, that could be embarrassing to them
or otherwise give a foreign intelligence service or other bad actor basis
for a recruitment pitch or blackmail. Archetypical examples are illicit
sexual infidelity, large debts or expensive tastes, loyalties to extremist
causes or foreign powers, crimes or substance abuse problems, and
38
resentments or other psychological vulnerabilities. CIA officer Aldrich
Ames's recruitment by the Soviet KGB through payments and
ego-stroking-which led to the identification and murder of nearly a
dozen Soviets who were clandestinely helping the United States-is a
39
It also reflects a
canonical case from the intelligence world.
often lose their
most
personnel
Military
cross-professional phenomenon.
discipline
lawyer
while
clearances and sell secrets for financial reasons,
cases commonly involve violations of bar rules that protect the funds of
clients and colleagues. 40 On these and other bases, professionals of law,
37. "SMICE" factors-or "MICE" if "S/sex" is dropped into the "E" category under ego or
excitement-were classically considered as recruitment motives, both by U.S. case officers
considering potential foreign recruits and by U.S. counterintelligence and security clearance
investigators reviewing American clearance holders and candidates. There are other variants of
these rubrics. See generally, e.g., Randy Burkett, An Alternative Frameworkfor Agent Recruitment:
From MICE to RASCLS, 57 STUD. INTEL. 7 (2013) (urging attention on reciprocation, authority,

scarcity, commitment, liking, and social proof ("RASCLS") factors).
38. Id. at 11. Marital infidelity is a crime under military law. See Uniform Code of Military
Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (containing a general article criminalizing "disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline" and "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces"); MCM, supra note 20, pt. IV, ¶¶ 144-46. Therefore, a servicemember who has an
extramarital affair provides material for blackmail on multiple bases: potential disclosure to the
spouse and other family members, professional embarrassment "of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces" and those involved, and violation of the law.

§ 934.

39.

Burkett, supra note 37, at 9, 12, 17.

40.

See Lindy Kyzer, Top Reasons for Security ClearanceDenial in 2017, CLEARANCEJOBS

(Jan. 31, 2018), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/01/31/top-reasons-security-clearance-denial2017. On the other hand, there is evidence that student loan defaults and other common financial
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arms, and espionage face professional discipline, expulsion, or criminal
sanction for rationalized compromise of their professional obligations."
B.

The Special Relationship: Principals and Principles

A final relational commonality of the legal, military, and
intelligence professions is the centrality of the relationship with their
principal. The relationship with the client, commander, or intelligence
customer (or their subordinates) can be one's most intimate and ramified
professional relationship, after the relationship with themselves. It is
often hazardous for people in each profession in ways recognizable to
the other two when acting as advisor or agent.
Serving principals without compromise of principles can be a
challenge even in the best of times. Senior principals in government (the
President, top political appointees, members of Congress, and others) are
often demanding and forceful personalities; gentle souls rarely make it to
the top.42 They typically have limited time, incomplete information, less
subject matter expertise and experience than their advisors and agents,
and worries of embarrassment or other political vulnerability. For these
reasons, senior principals may feel intimidated by lawyers, career
military professionals, or members of the spy services. Principals may
defensively respond with intimidating conduct or other power moves.
Senior principals always have agendas-a lattice of ideas and instincts
about law and fact; ideological commitments; or political, policy,
bureaucratic, or personal projects. Principals may seek to enlist and
coopt lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers. Or they may maneuver
to dissuade these professionals from standing in their way. Professionals
also can expect to encounter senior officials who do not share their
professional background or high ethical standards. That can frustrate
effective communication and even imperil trust and respect. President
Clinton's extramarital affair and related deceptions and President
Trump's penchants for false statements and prioritizing selfish personal
interests, for example, spurred tension in relationships with the military
and IC for both Commanders-in-Chief because, in both cases, the
President's behavior was so at odds with heightened military and IC
duties of integrity and ego subordination.4 3 Also, it bears emphasis that
problems are not good predictors of compromise or other misconduct. See, e.g., Arthur F.
Greenbaum, Administrative and Interim Suspensions in the Lawyer Regulatory Process-A

Preliminary Inquiry, 47 AKRON L. REV. 65, 84-85 (2014).
41. See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 40, at 86-88; LEONARD WONG & STEPHEN J. GERRAS,
LYING TO OURSELVES: DISHONESTY IN THE ARMY PROFESSION 19-20, 22 (2015).

42. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 123-24.
43.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (illustrating the crime of "extramarital sexual
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senior principals are superiors, wielding line authority or other influence
over the careers of subordinates.
In navigating relationships with principals, the central and common
task of legal, military, and intelligence professionals is to serve both
their professional ethical obligations and their obligation of service.
What lawyers call "client-itis" represents per se failure: full merger with
the principal to the abandonment of independent judgment. Ethical
practice in the face of intimidation and powerful principals requires
courage. Being a professional of independence and integrity, and not
becoming a "yes-man" or "yes-woman", is not simply an objective but
intrinsic to the jobs of lawyer, soldier, and intelligence officer.
Professionals in each field work to serve both their independence
and their service obligations in two main contexts: as advisor and as
agent.
If they are doing their jobs competently, legal, military, and
intelligence professionals provide frank and candid advice despite
intimidation or other pressures. When pressed to agree with an
unsupported assertion or a false statement, they must refuse. When
pushed for black-and-white answers or misleading metrics, they must
stick up for grey, for nuance, for deeper understanding, and, as
necessary, for more inquiry.4 They must not only acknowledge gaps and
uncertainties in law or fact, and in their own personal knowledge, but
indeed seek them out, flag them for principals as necessary when they
cannot be resolved before briefing him or her, and work to resolve them
fully and quickly and report back.4 5 Covering for omissions,

conduct" under military law); Bradley Graham, Military Leaders Worry Privately About Impact;
Some Troops Offended by Double Standard, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1998, at A10 (expressing
discomfort within the military with the Commander-in-Chief not facing the same penalties as
servicemembers); Daniel Barkhuff & William Burke, Trump Has Little Advice to Offer Naval
Graduates,

Academy

BALT.

SUN

(May

22,

2018,
20

10:50

AM),

180522-story.html
https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0523-trump-usna(critiquing that President Trump is "guided by self-interest, ego, impulse and immediate
self-gratification" and prone to lying); Justin Wise, Defense Expert Lists 6 Trump Errors in 2

Minutes

of

His

Navy

Speech,

THE

HILL

(May

25,

2018,

4:38

PM),

https://thehill. com/policy/defense/38943 5-defense-expert-lists-six-trump-errors-in-two-minutes-of-

his-navy-speech-inbox.
44. See Michael Morell, Former CIA Officer Kristin Wood on the Production, Delivery and
Value of Analysis, INTEL. MATTERS (Sept. 3, 2019), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/former-

(featuring Kristin
cia-officer-kristin-wood-on-production-delivery/id1286906615?i=100044849708
Wood, former CIA briefer to the Vice President and other top officials, and recounting pressure
from senior government officials to have intelligence align with their viewpoints and the importance
of officers standing firm on the facts and their best judgments); JOSHUA ROVNER, FIXING THE
FACTS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLIGENCE 5 (2011) (describing typology of

intelligence-policy relations, including neglect, excessive harmony, and politicization).
45. See, e.g., Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, FOREIGN AFFS.,
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uncertainties, or inevitable mistakes in the work produced by one's
institution or by one's self is professional misconduct, no matter how
irritated or disappointed their principal might become when informed.
All three varieties of professionals must be prepared to adapt their
communication modalities to suit the learning style, available time, and
other circumstances in which their principals operate, but must be
resolute in not shading the content of their candid assessments. 46
Additionally, all three kinds of advisors must remember that they often
have multiple principals or customers-for example, the Congress, in
addition to their executive branch superiors. General Eric Shinseki,
then-Chief of Staff of the Army, did the right thing when, prior to the
2003 Iraq War, he fulfilled his duty to provide candid professional
military advice to Congress about force needs, even though that
appraisal led to criticism and marginalization by his disagreeing and
most proximate principal, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.4 7
In short, the duty of all three advisors is, in the words of the IC's
Ethical Principles, to "speak truth to power"-no matter who or how
much the truth hurts.48

Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 15, 16-19.
46. David Priess has provided a valuable analysis of the different learning styles of Presidents
when receiving the President's Daily Brief ("PDB") on intelligence, and how intelligence briefers
have adapted the written and oral PDBs in terms of length and format. See DAVID PRIESS, THE
PRESIDENT'S BOOK OF SECRETS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS TO AMERICA'S
PRESIDENTS FROM KENNEDY TO OBAMA 206-11 (2016). President Trump has been criticized for not

reading more than a page, and the IC has been criticized for going along with Trump's evident
preference for seeing his name in every PDB "article" and understanding how the report matters to

him personally. These are valid concerns about the President, along with reports that the President
reads the PDB perhaps only once a week. See John Walcott, 'Willful Ignorance.'Inside President

Trump's
Troubled Intelligence Briefings, TIME
(Feb.
5, 2019,
10:43 AM),
https://time.com/5518947/donald-trump-intelligence-briefings-national-security; Carol D. Leonnig
et al., Breaking with Tradition, Trump Skips President's Written Intelligence Report and Relies on

Oral

Briefings,

WASH.

POST

(Feb.

9,

2018,

10:02

AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/breaking-with-tradition-trump-skips-presidents-written-in

story.ht
telligence-report-for-oral-briefmgs/2018/02/09/b7ba569e-Oc52-l1e8-95a5-c396801049ef
ml. Reports that PDB briefers have not told the President about important intelligence that he finds
politically inconvenient-namely about election interference on his behalf and other bad behavior
by Russia-implicate the professional obligations of intelligence officers. Natasha Bertrand & Kyle
Cheney, Russia Bounty Flap Highlights Intel Breakdown Under Trump, POLITICO (July 1, 2020,
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/01/russia-bounty-intel-breakdown-trumpPM),
4:50
347224.
47.

See Thom Shanker, New Strategy Vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

12, 2007, at A13 (noting that the General's influence became dramatically diminished).
48.

See Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community, supra note 23

(intelligence professionals "speak truth to power"); Stavridis, supra note 21 ("Our senior active duty
military leaders must [speak] forcefully and directly to national leadership, speaking truth to power
in uncomfortable ways. They must do this at the risk of their career.").
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The foundational professional act of role assumption involves
stepping not only into the role of advisor but often, too, that of agent.49
For some professionals, agent is an occasional role, while for others it is
a primary role. In any case, balancing obligations to principal and
principle can be especially challenging when the professional interacts
with third parties at the direction of the principal.
To be sure, answering information and analysis requests, or
collecting additional intelligence or other information in lawful ways,
may be challenging for a variety of practical reasons, but generally raises
few professional concerns. Taking direct action in the field-be it
representing a principal at a meeting, conducting military operations or
engaging in liaison activity with friendly intelligence services, or
conducting covert action-is also reasonably straightforward when
everyone is following the law and professional norms in good faith. The
professional must even be willing to undertake courses of action against
which they advised but which the principal legally, reasonably, and in
good faith selected. But professionals in government must also be
careful not to allow their loyalty to the Constitution to be overtaken by
personal or partisan loyalty to politico principals exercising
constitutional authority. 50 They must also be on guard for their pretextual
use as agents-orders for which a legitimate reason is given, but which
plainly have a politically partisan or personal actual motive.
Ethical challenges may also arise in the course of advocacy:
speaking on behalf of the principal or in support of the principal's
policies. Representative and advocate are core lawyer roles, ones
governed by the MRPC, state bar authorities, and other laws and norms.
The lawyer's ability to make any non-frivolous argument on behalf of
their client operates in concert with duties of candor and honesty toward
third parties.51 Heightened duties of independence and integrity weigh
still more heavily on military and intelligence professionals. The
"non-frivolous" lawyer's standard for arguments to third parties is far

49. See MAURER, supra note 21, at 95-96 (discussing this idea in the military context).
50. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326, generally bans political activity by government
employees while on duty and use of government resources for political purposes. Lawyers working
for law enforcement agencies and non-military employees in national security positions (including
intelligence personnel) have heightened restrictions (a ban on any active role in political activity,
even while not on duty) as "further restricted employees." See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2)(B); see also
Federal

Employee

Hatch

Act

Information,

U.S.

OFF.

OF

SPECIAL

COUNS.,

https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/HatchAct-Federal.aspx#tabGroup31 (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
Partisan activity by the military is banned under Department of Defense Directive 1344.10. See
supra note 21.
51. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.1, 3.1, 3.3(a), 4.1, 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N

2020) (relating to non-frivolous arguments, candor, and dishonesty).
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lower than the lawyer's obligation to provide, in private, their best
advice to clients and the intelligence professional's obligation to offer
assessments-whether private or public-that represent their best
judgment and speak truth to power without political slant. As noted
above, statutes protect the right of top officers to provide their own
independent, best assessments to Congress and senior executive branch
officials, and the freedom of military lawyers to offer independent
advice. Military and intelligence officers may provide information and
analysis to the public and other actors in support of lawful principal
decisions, but must guard against becoming lawyer-like advocates for
their politically-chosen principal. This is, for example, why serving
military officers who have taken senior White House roles normally
reserved to politicos are sometimes branded "political" by and distrusted
within their military service communities.52 A related risk is that the
pressures of advocacy in an intensely contentious political arena will
have blow-back effects, creating incentives for information, analysis,
and advice that are unwelcome to their principal to be skewed or
suppressed. Indeed, the CIA's analytical work and reputation suffered as
a result of then-CIA Director George Tenet participating in presentations
to the Congress and the United Nations of the George W. Bush
Administration's case regarding Iraq and weapons of mass destructiona case later exposed as flawed. 53

52. Examples of such appointments of actively-serving officers include General Alexander
Haig as White House Chief of Staff by President Nixon, Lieutenant General Colin Powell as
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ("APNSA" or "National Security Advisor")
by President Reagan, and Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster as APNSA by President Trump. In the
case of McMaster, for example, the Army was reportedly reluctant to promote McMaster after his
service as Trump's APNSA, a role in which McMaster wrote op-eds and did other advocacy work
for the President's policies. See Greg Jaffe & Josh Dawsey, Trump and McMaster Have Seemed
Anxious to Part but So Far Remain Together, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2018, 7:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-and-mcmaster-have-seemed-anxio
us-to-part-but-so-far-remain-together/2018/03/01/adl2a19a-1 d98-11 e8-9de1-147dd2df3829_.story.h
tml (showing the military's reluctance to promote McMaster); H.R. McMaster & Gary D. Cohn,
America First Doesn't Mean America Alone, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2017, 7:37 PM),
(providing an
https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426
example of McMaster arguing for presidential policy).
53. The CIA participated in the preparation of presidential speeches, an incorrect national
intelligence assessment regarding Iraq, and-with CIA Director Tenet seated behind Secretary of
State Colin Powell-in the Bush Administration's presentation to the United Nations Security
Council. See ROBERT DRAPER, TO START A WAR: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TOOK
AMERICA INTO IRAQ 275-76 (2020) (containing an intelligence expert's discussion of the effects of

CIA assistance in advocacy).
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THE NOW-PROFESSIONALS UNDER PRESSURE AND WHAT IS TO
BE DONE

To be clear, the vast majority of professionals in government do
their jobs with honor and integrity. Pressure to compromise their
principles is rare, as is rationalization of serious ethics or legal
violations. Even so, the legal, military, and intelligence professional
communities are large, and every year cases come to light of
professionals who have lowered their standards and face discipline. And
every presidential administration at some point sees an overbearing
official push policies, assumptions, or preferences too hard when
working with their advisors or agents. The good news is that these
problems, although certainly worrisome whenever they occur, normally
happen at a relatively low rate of incidence and certainly do not reflect a
coordinated effort.
This Article goes to press in times that are not normal.
President Donald Trump took office surfing a wave of populist
disdain for elites with expertise. 54 From his administration's first days in
office, it embraced a conspiracy theory that alleged that professionals in
government-including legal, military, and intelligence officers-were a
"deep State" set against the President for partisan reasons.55 In reality,
lawyers, soldiers, and the spy services were overwhelmingly doing their
jobs in accordance with the law, norms, and their ethical commitments.
They were practicing their loyalty to their ultimate principals, the
Constitution and the public, and upholding high professional standards
even if it meant saying and doing things that the President and his
partisans found inconvenient.
Fully capturing the enormous pressure put on professionals during
the Trump Administration would require a book-length treatment, but a
quick overview will demonstrate the effort's intensity regarding public
servants in the professions of law, arms, and intelligence. This Part of
the Article also recommends steps that these professionals and their
allies can take to protect their ability to honor their ethical commitments,
most notably their independence and integrity. 56

54. See, e.g., TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND wHY IT MATTERS 210-13, 215 (2017).
55. Charles S. Clark, Deconstructingthe Deep State: Donald Trump Isn't the FirstPresident
to Be Deeply Skeptical of the Institutions and People He Now Leads, GOV'T. EXEC.,

https://www.govexec.com/feature/gov-exec-deconstructing-deep-state (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
while new administrations are often in tension with non-political public servants, the severity of
such tension during the Trump years remains remarkable. See id.
56. See supra Part V.B.
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The President'sAnti-ProfessionalPressureCampaign

President Trump and his team have put pressure on the
independence of lawyers, law enforcement, and the rule of law without
precedent since President Richard Nixon sequentially fired top Justice
Department officials for investigating his role in the Watergate
scandal." Although prohibited by Justice Department policy from
pursuing indictment of a sitting President, Special Counsel Robert
Mueller, former Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Director,
presented considerable evidence that President Trump and his team
obstructed law enforcement personnel in their investigation into ties
between the Trump campaign and Russian espionage to aid Trump
during the 2016 election and related matters. 58 Among other things, the
President asked for the personal loyalty of, and then fired, FBI Director
James Comey, for overseeing the independent law enforcement
investigation prior to Mueller's appointment. 59 The President fired
Acting Attorney General Sally Yates in part for reporting profound
concerns that the President's National Security Advisor, retired
Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, lied to federal investigators and
contacts of Russian agents. 60 Later, most of the Justice Department
career prosecutors handling the Flynn case resigned, likely in protest,
when the Attorney General abandoned prosecution of Flynn, who had
pled guilty to lying to the FBI-a move by the Attorney General that is
part of a larger effort to undo the work of career Justice Department and
FBI professionals during the Russia investigation. 61 Additionally, the
57. Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/5
37921.
58. See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1-2 (2019) [hereinafter
MUELLER REPORT].

59. Id. at 3-4, 12, 24, 62-63, 71.
60. Id. at 24, 31; Riley Beggin & Veronica Stracqualursi, A Timeline of Sally Yates's
Warnings to the White House About Mike Flynn, ABC NEWS (May 8, 2017, 9:44 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-sally-yates-warnings-white-house-mike-flynn/storyid=47
272979.
See C. Ryan Barber, Thousands of Ex-Prosecutors Urge Flynn Judges to Question Barr's
to
Drop
Case,
LAW.COM
(May
11,
2020,
1:51
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/05/1 1/thousands-of-ex-prosecutors-urge-flynn-judge
-to-question-barrs-move-to-drop-case; Erik Larson, Flynn Prosecutor Steps Down as Case Is
61.

Move

Reportedly
Being
Dropped,
BLOOMBERG
(May
7,
2020,
2:41
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-07/flynn-prosecutor-van-grack-steps-down-fro
m-criminal-case; Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Moves to Drop Case Against Trump Ex-Adviser Flynn, Who
Admitted Lying to FBI, U.S. NEWS (May 7, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/topnews/articles/2020-05-07/prosecutor-abruptly-quits-handling-case-against-ex-trump-adviser-michae
1-flynn; Mark Mazzetti, In Flynn Case, BarrAgain Takes Aim at Mueller Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May
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President repeatedly berated his first Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, for
rightly recusing himself and appointing Mueller, criticized the Deputy
Attorney General for overseeing Mueller's investigation, and attempted
to remove Mueller for conducting his independent investigation in
accordance with the law and his ethical obligations. 62 Trump pardoned
Flynn and other loyalists who had been prosecuted for serious offenses
and further undermined respect for the rule of law by denigrating judges
who issued rulings that displeased him-attacks on the judiciary that
drew a rare rebuke of a President from the Supreme Court's Chief
Justice. 63
The President has taken a variety of extraordinary steps that raise
profound concern about politicization of the armed forces. Credible
reports indicate that the President has harshly criticized military leaders
for providing advice regarding alliances and other global security
matters with which the President does not agree." Secretary of Defense
James Mattis, a retired Marine general, resigned because he found his
independent advice on these matters unwelcome.6 ' The President has
given speeches to military audiences that are highly partisan both in their
content and campaign-style staging." Trump unsuccessfully pushed for
a Red Square-style domestic display of force. 67 The President excoriated,
18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/us/politics/barr-mueller-investigation-flynn.html.
62.

See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 58, at 48, 78, 80, 86.

63. See Kevin Johnson & Kristine Phillips, President Trump PardonsEx-National Security
Advisor Michael Flynn; Ends Three-Year Legal Odyssey, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2020, 12:32 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/25/michael-flynn-trump-announces-pardonformer-national-security-advisor/6419985002; Kevin Liptak et al., Trump PardonsFormerSheriff
Joe Arpaio, CNN (Aug. 27, 2017, 2:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/25/politics/sheriff-joearpaio-donald-trump-pardon/index.html (reporting Trump's pardon of one of his supporters who
was convicted of criminal contempt of court); Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in
Extraordinary
Scrap
over
Judges,
AP
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://apnews.com/article/c4b34f9639el41069c08cfl e3deb6b84.
64. See Leo Shane, III, Trump Blasted Top Military Generals as 'A Bunch of Dopes and
Babies'
According
to
New
Book,
MILrARYTIMES
(Jan.
17,
2020),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/01/17/trump-blasted-top-military-gen
erals-as-a-bunch-of-dopes-and-babies-according-to-new-book; Joshua Geltzer, Trump Loved "His
Generals"-Until He
Got
to
Know
Them,
JUST
SEC.
(Jan.
2,
2020),
Ryan
https://www.justsecurity.org/67884/trump-loved-his-generals-until-he-got-to-know-them;
Pickrell, Trump Called the Generals Under His Command a 'Bunch of P---ies, ' New Book Says,

BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2020, 1:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-called-generalsunder-his-command-bunch-of-pssies-book-2020-9.
65. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Man Who Couldn't Take It Anymore, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/10/james-mattis-trump/5 96665.
66. See Michael R. Gordon, Trump's Mix of Politics and Military Is Faulted, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/trump-macdill-air-base.html.
("[O]vert partisanship before an audience of armed forces personnel runs against a decades-long
legacy.").
67.

See Dakota S. Rudesill, Trump's Military Parade: Pennsylvania Avenue is Not Red
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and the White House reassigned a National Security Council official, an
Army officer, who complied with a congressional subpoena regarding
Trump's attempt to pressure the Ukrainian President into investigating
Trump's domestic political opponent (presidential conduct so abusive of
the office that it led to Trump becoming only the third President ever
impeached). 68 The White House also retaliated against the officer's
brother, a military lawyer. 69 In June 2020, the President was roundly
criticized by General Mattis and other retired senior military officers
(among many others) for using the National Guard and other militarized
federal forces to clear Lafayette Square of non-violent demonstrators in
order to stage a presidential photo opportunity and shoot a
campaign-style video including the Attorney General, Defense
Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.70 The Chairman,
General Mark Milley, subsequently felt compelled to issue guidance to
the entire United States military as to the non-political nature of the
armed forces, and to apologize in public for his, and thereby the
military's, involvement in the Lafayette Square incident. 71
The President's pressure campaign has remarkably been even more
intense regarding intelligence professionals. President Trump and his
team have repeatedly sought to dissuade and intimidate the IC from
doing its job to "speak truth to power."" Trump has criticized the IC and

Square, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-militaryparade-pennsylvania-avenue-not-red-square (urging Congress to generally prohibit such parades

except in case of a war victory); see also Dakota S. Rudesill, The Land and Naval Forces Clause,
86 U. CIN. L. REV. 391, 410, 412 n.79 (2018) (providing that, in addition to its appropriations
power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution provides Congress with the constitutional authority to
make such "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces").
68. Devlin Barrett et al., Whistleblower Claimed that Trump Abused His Office and that White
House Officials Tried to Cover It up, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019, 6:11 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/house-intelligence-committee-releases-whistlebl
owers-complaint-citing-trumps-call-with-ukraines-president/2019/09/26/402052ee-e056-1e9-be966adb81821e90_story.html.
69. Leo Shane, III, Brother ofArmy Officer Who Testified Against Trump Alleges Widespread
Abuse, Retaliation at National Security Council, MILrrARYTIMES (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/08/26/brother-of-army-officer-who-

testified-against-trump-alleges-widespread-abuse-retaliation-at-national-security-agency.
70. Veronica Stracqualursi, The Prominent Former Military Leaders Who Have Criticized
Trump's

Actions

over

Protests,

CNN

(June

5,

2020,

6:17

PM),

https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/politics/military-leaders-trump-floyd-protests/index.html.
71.

Robert Burns, Milley Says He Was Wrong to Accompany Trump on Church Walk During

George
Floyd
Protests,
MILITARYTIMES
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/06/l l/milley-says-he-was-wrong-to-acco
mpany-trump-on-church-walk-during-george-floyd-protests.
72.

See Robert Draper, Unwanted Truths: Inside Trump's Battles with U.S. Intelligence

Agencies, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/magazine/usrussia-intelligence.html; supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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its leaders (both civilian and military) for their independent assessments
that Russian intelligence intervened in the 2016 election in ways to
discredit U.S. democracy and help Trump, and for their testimony to
Congress about Russia, North Korea, and Iran that diverged from the
President's preferences. 73 The President has ousted a shockingly large
slate of senior intelligence officials, including the Director of National
Intelligence ("DNI"), Acting DNI, Principal Deputy DNI, Director of the
National Counter-Terrorism Center, the DNI's Chief of Election
security, the IC Inspector General, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, for following the law and their ethical obligations in providing
assessments regarding Russia's ongoing election interference and other
matters, or taking actions that were politically inconvenient for the
President. 74 The President sent a stunning message of "no confidence" to
the IC when he stated at his 2018 summit with Russian President
Vladimir Putin, overseer of the world's most hostile and capable
adversary intelligence services, that he believed Putin instead of U.S.
75
intelligence professionals, in reference to Russian election interference.
The President and his team have also signaled that Trump does not
want to receive information or analytical assessments at odds with his
beliefs and perceived personal political interests regarding Russia and
other matters. Reportedly, the President's Daily Brief ("PDB") on
76
intelligence and other estimates have reflected this skewing guidance.
In abuses of power that telegraphed obvious threats and incentives to
intelligence and military personnel regarding expressing themselves, the

73. Eileen Sullivan, Trump Calls Intelligence Officers 'Naive' After They Contradict Him,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/politics/trump2019),
30,
(Jan.
TIMES
N.Y.
intelligence.html.
74. See generally John Walcott, Trump's Latest Intelligence Meltdown Isn't About the Facts.
It's About the Truth, TIME (Feb. 20, 2020, 10:53 PM), https://time.com/5788479/trump-firesmaguire; David Weina, Exclusive: After Quitting Last Year, Senior U.S. Intelligence Official Now

Talks, NPR (Aug. 13, 2020, 8:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/13/902345240/exclusive-after("While Gordon recalls all five
quitting-last-year-senior-u-s-intelligence-official-now-talks
presidents she briefed periodically finding certain intelligence inconvenient, she says Russian
interference in the 2016 election and ensuing investigations into that activity were 'a particularly
contentious topic' for Trump."); Eric Schmitt et al., In Pushfor 2020 Election Security, Top Official
Was
Warned:
Don't
Tell
Trump,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2019),

("In the months
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/russia-2020-election-trump.html
before Kirstjen Nielsen was forced to resign, she tried to focus the White House on one of her
highest priorities as homeland security secretary: preparing for new and different forms of Russian
interreference in the 2020 election. President Trump's chief of staff told her not to bring it up in
front of the president.").
75. Ron Elving, Trump's Helsinki Bow to Putin Leaves World Wondering: Why?, NPR (July
17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629601233/trumps-helsinki-bow-to-putinleaves-world-wondering-whats-up.
76. See Draper, supra note 72.
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President unprecedentedly directed the revocation of the security
clearance of former CIA Director John Brennan (a career intelligence
officer) due to Brennan's First Amendment-protected criticism of the
President and arranged for clearances for family members and other
White House personnel over serious objections from career professionals
regarding their foreign national contacts and vulnerability to blackmail
by foreign powers. 77 For these and other reasons, multiple former senior
career intelligence officials have warned that intelligence during the
Trump Administration has become politicized.7 8 Trump's first DNI,
former Republican Senator Dan Coats, like other national security
officials, reportedly had well-grounded concern that Trump's unusual
behavior regarding Russia was driven by Russia's possession of
compromising information about the President. 79 In the months before
the 2020 election, Trump's second Senate-confirmed DNI informed
Congress that briefings on Russian and other foreign espionage against
the U.S. elections would only be provided in written form-an
extraordinary and disturbing development that gave politically-appointed
leadership more control over what Congress is informed of and
prevented oversight committees from verbally questioning career
professionals to better understand the reports and surface any
independent assessments at odds with the preferences of the President. 80
After the election, the President, in an unprecedented cleaning-of-house,
replaced the Secretary of Defense and other top Pentagon civilian
intelligence officials, installing political loyalists in several jobs. 81
77. Michael Poznansky, Trump Revoked John Brennan's Security Clearance. The Long-Term
Consequences
May
Be
Dire,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
20,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/08/20/trump-revoked-j ohn-brennans
-security-clearance-heres-why-that-matters; Maggie Haberman et al., Trump Ordered Officials to
Give
Jared Kushner
a
Security
Clearance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/us/politics/jared-kushner-security-clearance.html.
78. See, e.g., Michael Morell et al., Trump's Politicization of U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Could
End
in
Disaster,
FOREIGN
POL'Y
(Apr.
28,
2020,
1:42
AM),

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/trump-cia-intimidation-politicization-us-intelligenceagencies-could-end-in-disaster; Michael Morell, Former CIA Deputy Directors on Life Inside the

Agency, INTEL. MATTERS (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-david-cohenavril-haines-talk-with-michael-morell-on-intelligence-matters.
79. Former Intelligence Chief Dan Coats Had 'Deep Suspicions' Russia 'HadSomething' on

Trump, Woodward Book Says, UPOLITICS (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.msn.com/enus/news/politics/former-intelligence-chief-dan-coats-had-deep-suspicions-russia-had-something-ontrump-woodward-book-says/ar-BBI 8XTLQ.

80.

Emma Newburger, Director of National Intelligence Will No Longer Brief Congress in

Person on
Foreign Election
Interference,
CNBC
(Aug
30,
2020,
2:03
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/29/national-intel-director-will-no-longer-give-congress-in-person-

briefmgs-on-election-interference.html.
81. See Barbara Starr et al., Trump Administration Removes Senior Defense Officials and
Installs
Loyalists,
Triggering
Alarm
at
Pentagon,
CNN,
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Protecting the Professions

When President-Elect Joe Biden announced key members of his
national security team in November 2020, he emphasized that they will
82
"tell me what I need to know, not what I want to know." Even so, the
anti-professional tide in American culture remains relatively high; a
Trump-style pressure campaign could return depending on who wins the
next presidential election; and, of course, the more quotidian but still
worrisome guild parochialism, policy-maker pressure, foreign
recruitment efforts, and rationalized self-corruption of which this Article
warns should not be expected to cease. The professions of law, arms,
and intelligence and their allies should therefore move to protect themin the current moment and over the long run. What needs to be done can
be arranged under the relational categories identified in Part IV of this
Article. 83
First, within their professions, lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence
officers should meet anti-professional pressure with recommitment to
their values and their colleagues. They must maintain or raise high
standards for recruiting, training, licensure, and ongoing professional
education. They should reinvigorate both ethics training and
enforcement of professional standards. All three professions must, in
particular, train themselves in spotting and counteracting the cognitive
bias that can flow from pressure from principals.
The professions should also work with legislative and executive
branch officials to reinforce and, as needed, enhance protections within
government. Ethical principles should be given statutory force more
extensively. For example, in addition to reaffirming and strengthening
the Hatch Act's ban on political use of government resources, Congress
could legislate the IC's Principles of Professional Ethics and ethics
codes of the military services, along with the Defense Department's
administrative ban on political activities. The whistleblowing channel
and congressional subpoenas that were conduits for professionals to
speak truth to power in the Ukraine scandal must be protected. The
professions should also study whether to make resignation or withdrawal

https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/10/politics/pentagon-policy-official-resigns/index.html
(Nov. 13,
2020, 3:31 PM) (reporting the Trump administration's installation of new officials in the positions
of Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and General Counsel of the National Security Agency).
82. See Matt Viser, After Long, Bitter Delay, Biden Transition Kicks into Gear, WASH. POST
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-transition2020, 8:20
24,
(Nov.
trump/2020/11/24/26b8e4ba-2e7a-11 eb-bae0-50bbl7126614_story.html.
83.

See supra PartIV.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/7

24

Rudesill: At the Elbow and under Pressure: Legal, Military, and Intelligenc

2020]

AT THE ELBOW AND UNDER PRESSURE

185

from matters easier for lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers faced
with unethical or illegal pressures or orders. 84
Second, lawyers, military servicemembers, and intelligence
personnel should collaborate across professional lines in defending the
independence and high ethical standards of all the professions. They
should recognize what this Article most importantly seeks to
communicate-just how much they have in common. Perhaps led by
individuals with credentials in multiple fields, these three communities
should seek to check parochial tendencies with fraternal and
collaborative ones. They should foster regular dialogue as part of initial
training through continuing professional education about their common
commitments and challenges-and the common cause they can make
against anti-professionalism. They can also rally around and urge
Congress to stipulate only for-good-cause removal of Inspectors
General, a vital accountability feature of American governance now
under severe pressure (President Trump has relieved multiple Inspectors
General for doing their jobs),85 recognizing that the analysis of law,
military, and intelligence done by Inspectors General involves
professionals from each of their fields and serves their professional
commitments to independence, integrity, and good process.
Third, in terms of adversarial relationships, the American public
that is increasingly skeptical of the value of these and other professions
needs to be helped to understand their importance to the country.
Professionals with expertise need to be supported in confronting
anti-professionalism and bad information. That includes confronting
conspiracy theories and other low-quality ideas about the "deep State,"
and defending the kind of elitism that is valuable-specialized
knowledge and training and heightened ethical commitments. 86

84. One idea is creating standing funds of "I quit" money for professionals who resign in the
face of pressure to do unethical or illegal things-accounts analogous to the funds created for the
dependents of intelligence personnel lost in the line of duty after 9/11. See Annalise Knudson, 18
Years Later: A Guide to Resources Available for Sept. 11 Victims, Families, SILIVE.COM,
https://www.silive.com/news/2019/09/18-years-later-a-guide-to-resources-available-for-sept-1 1victims-families.html (Sept. 10, 2019). Charging an outside body with review of the merit of
for-conscience resignation decisions could provide a check on opportunistic or unwarranted
resignations.
85. William Roberts, Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, the Trump Administration Targets
Government Watchdogs, CTR.
FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(June
1,
2020,
9:04 AM),

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2020/06/01/485656/amid-coronaviruspandemic-trump-administration-targets-government-watchdogs.
86.

The author underscores the term "valuable elitism." Status and opportunities that are

distributed on the basis of inherited or otherwise unearned socioeconomic power, in contrast, reflect
very problematic elitism. The public is right to be concerned about this, and our nation has much
work to do.
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The other adversarial relationship that will have so much to do with
the prospects of the professions of law, arms, and intelligence inside the
U.S. government is that with principals. Leaders must set the right tone,
emphasizing the highest ethical standards. Professionals also need to be
better trained experientially-from the initial education in their fields
through continuing professional education-both in cross-profession
teamwork and in how to work with demanding and even hostile
principals without compromising their principles. 87 This training ought
to include how to set expectations with principals as to the ethical
obligations of the professions and what the principal's advisors and
agents are willing and unwilling to do. A terrific example of such
strategic communication was provided by General Milley, who in the
context of the President's efforts to politicize the military, stated
publicly to Congress that the United States military would stay out of the
2020 presidential election. 88
VI.

CONCLUSION

Legal, military, and intelligence work may appear, at first glance, to
be very different. Each profession does require special training, and their
practice settings can differ at times. But these three vital professions
often work together, and each profession has a common core of
of
duties
heightened
particularly
commitments,
professional
independence, and integrity. Being people of integrity is their individual,
collective, and common job. They are similarly situated and can learn a
great deal from one another. They can, and indeed should, make
common cause in the face of powerful anti-professional pressure from
the public and some of the principals that public sentiment elevates to
high office. Ultimately, the ability of lawyers, military personnel, and
intelligence officers to set aside tribal parochialism, and to inform and
motivate allies, will be integral to their ability over the long run to
uphold their high ethical standards and do their vital work for the
country.

87. See The Ohio State National Security Simulation, THE OHIO STATE UNIV.: MORITZ COLL.
OF L., https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/national-security-simulation (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (featuring a

simulation, designed by the author, that serves to train legal, military, and intelligence students in
cross-profession collaboration and how to work with demanding senior leaders).
88. Ryan Browne, Top US General Tells Congress the Military Won't Play a Role in the 2020
Election, CNN (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/28/politics/milley-2020election/index.html; see also Daniel Maurer, Breaking Ranks in a Civil-Military Crisis: Strategic
Communication

to

Register

Dissent,

JUST

SEC.

(Aug.

26,

2020),

https://www.justsecurity.org/72164/breaking-ranks-in-a-civil-military-crisis-strategic-communicatio
n-to-register-dissent (describing and urging such advisement by senior military officers).
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